From 1984 until 1993, the Indian state of Punjab witnessed a sustained insurgency by Sikh militants campaigning for a separate sovereign state. This insurgency was ultimately defeated by the overwhelming use of security force that officially resulted in the deaths of 30,000 people. By the mid-1990s, a 'normalcy' had returned to Punjab politics, but the underlying issues which had fuelled the demand for separatism remain unaddressed. This paper examines critically the argument that India's ethno-linguistic federation is exceptional in accommodating ethno-nationalist movements. By drawing on the Punjab case-study, it argues that special considerations apply to the governance of peripheral regions (security, religion). Regional elites in these states struggle to build legitimacy because such legitimacy poses a threat to India's nation and state-building. In short, India's ethno-linguistic federation is only partially successful in managing ethno-linguistic demands in the peripheral Indian states.
Introduction
Measured by the experience of post-colonial states, federalism in India is relatively successful. Forged against division of the country in 1947, which created the dominions of India and Pakistan, it has stood the test of time, accommodating high levels of social and cultural diversity to evolve as a stable ethno-linguistic federation that today is a union of 29 states (Khilnani 1998; Suri 2016) . This evolution has been managed, in the main, by the Indian National Congress (INC), which led the independence movement, and after 1947, skilfully balanced the pressures of governance and development under the guardianship of Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister . Although the federal design has been contested by groups and states unreconciled to the partition of the country, or opposed to the excessive centralisation − that often leads some to describe it as 'quasifederal' (Wheare 1946 ) − most analysts suggest that these challenges have been overcome by creative sub-national solutions, increasing political power at the centre of discontented groups, and a normative commitment to defeating secession at whatever cost (Adeney 2007; Capoccia et al. 2012) . And if the Indian federation sometimes witnesses high levels of violence associated with secessionist movements, then these features, some argue, do not undermine the ethno-linguistic foundations of the union but can be explained by auxiliary factors; namely, the complex degree of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in these units, political mismanagement by the centre (Adeney 2015: 19) , i the exogenous influence of external states, or inappropriate timing in the process of democratisation (Chadda 2000) . The main narratives of Indian federalism insist that its blemishes are minor in contrast to its accomplishments (Kohli 2001) .
In this paper we offer an alternative reading of federalism in India. We do so by arguing that its defining characteristics are to be found in the ethnic idea of India articulated by the INC during the constitution-making process . This idea was anchored in
Hinduism that was seen to transcend the conventional markers of ethnicity -language, caste, region, and tribe (Smith 1986 ) -and embodied the dominant nationalist sentiment within the Constituent Assembly (Bajpai 2011) . This outlook was perfectly consistent with the idea of an ethno-linguistic federation within the mainstream heartland of India where 93 per cent of the country's 1.2 billion citizens live, but has been historically problematic in the peripheral This 'something deeper', which held the 'dream of unity' alive, had enabled India to overcome foreign conquest and maintain a social order. India's experience of 'three or four thousand years of cultural growth and continuity [was] remarkable': it could have taken place only if there was something in that culture 'which gave it the dynamic strength to do so, some inner vitality and understanding of life (Nehru 1989: 88) . Although Nehru carefully avoided identifying this quality with Hinduism, he was also quite clear that for him it was rooted in 'culture or religion'. This 'culture or religion' was so pervasive that Christians, Jews, Muslims and Parsees 'never ceased to be Indians on account of a change of their faith' (Nehru 1989: 62) . Nehru and the INC selected, rarefied and historicised the past in the name of 'non-nationalist nationalism'. An 'indissoluble connection' was established between
Hinduism and Indian civilisation's tolerance (Vanaik 1997: ch. 4) . But much of this construction of Indian history is borrowed directly from the work of German orientalists in the nineteenth century who celebrated the idea of Hindu tolerance embodied in the maxim that 'there are many levels of truth'. 'What follows from the assertion', as Embree notes, 'is not toleration; rather all truths, all social practices, can be encapsulated within the society as long as there is [a] willingness to accept the premise on which the encapsulation is based' (Embree 1990: 30) . Encapsulation can − like the Ottoman millet system − facilitate accommodation, co-option, and eventually assimilation, but not political equality. It is, however, distinct from modern strategies of integration based on common citizenship, or forced assimilation, and is essentially a pre-modern strategy of accommodation for the threatening 'other' as an 'inferior' religious 'truth' (Embree 1990; McGarry and O'Leary 1993) . Sikhs as well as all those who were not the designated religious minorities (Bajpai 2011; Kim 2015) .
ii In this way, Hinduism attained the status of a 'meta-ethnicity' in which there was inclusion, accommodation and pluralism within the Hindu tradition because, as Gellner reminds us, 'Hindus "speak the same language" even when they do not speak the same language' (Gellner 2006: 105) . In other words, the pantheon of Hinduism can accommodate linguistic, caste, regional, tribal diversity and internal pluralism. In post-Independence India, these fault lines between the dominant culture of Hinduism, and the ethno-linguistic divisions within it, on the one hand, and non-Hindu religions, on the other, would become difficult to bridge in the peripheral regions in the northwest and northeast.
The experience of the predominantly non-Hindu peripheral regions since 1947
suggests that there is an argument for considering India as an 'ethnic democracy' (Peled 1992; Yiftachel 1992) , iii which combine 'the extension of political and civil rights to individuals and certain collective rights to minorities with institutionalised dominance over the state by one of the ethnic groups' (Smooha 1990: 391 First, no secessionist movements were to be tolerated; where necessary they would be supressed by force. Second, given the commitment to a secular state, 'no demand for political recognition of a religious group would be considered'. Third, 'no capricious concessions would be made to the political demands of any linguistic, regional or other culturally defined groups'. Finally, 'no political concessions to cultural groups in conflict would be made unless they had demonstrable support from both sides in the conflict' (Brass 1991: 168) . By and large, these guidelines worked reasonably well in the Hindu heartlands.
In contrast, in the peripheral regions in the northwest and the northeast, special
considerations have always applied. Although Jammu and Kashmir is governed by Article 370 of the constitution, which ostensibly gives it special autonomy, the provisions of this article have been seriously eroded (Bose 2003) . In the 1950s and early 1960s, the campaign for a Punjabi-speaking state by the Shiromani Akali Dal ((SAD) the main Sikh political party) was firmly opposed on the grounds that it was a cover for a religious demand (Nayar 1966) ; it was only conceded after the SAD clearly articulated the demand in linguistic terms.
In the northeast, a heterogeneous region beset with internal and anti-national conflicts, the centre has used a variety of approaches -counterinsurgency tactics, the creation of new states, sub-state autonomy and the creation of special zones -to reorganise internal boundaries (see Adeney and Bhattacharyya in continues to be tested to the limit.
Adeney's Table 4 highlights the intensity of conflicts in these regions (Adeney 2017 ).
The PRIO database classifies many of these conflicts as a 'war'. In Kashmir, for example, some organisations claim that since 1990 over 100,000 people have been killed, 10,000 have disappeared and up to 15,000 have been detained without trial. In 2011, the Jammu and China war led to a major extension of the security architecture in the region to deal with internal and external threats (Maxwell 1972 
Punjab and the Sikhs
The qualitative and quantitative evidence of the precarious foundations of India's ethnolinguistic federation in the peripheral regions can be better illustrated with an in-depth state case-study. The Sikhs of Punjab are a distinctive ethno-national community defined by religion, language and ties with the historical province of Punjab (Grewal 1998; Pettigrew 1995) . Some of these pogroms were organised by Congressmen from Delhi who would subsequently assume senior positions within the party (see Jeffrey 1994; Tully and Jacob 1985) . power at the regional level: it is a response that accommodates ethnic regional elites but requires them to regularly disarticulate cultural and ethnic demands deemed unacceptable under the constitution. In the case of the Sikhs, the predominant nationalist discourse was that the ASR was a secessionist document because not only did it call for a reordering of India's centre-state relations, but also spoke of a region where Sikhs could exercise 'hegemony'
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Since 1997, the SAD has been in power in Punjab for 15 years in alliance with the BJP. Although it is formally committed to the ASR, its coalition with the BJP is predicated on the SAD disarticulating Sikh ethnic demands. Thus, during the first post-militancy SAD-BJP government (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , though the party fought the election on a manifesto of prosecuting security officers guilty of human rights violations, once in power its leader declared that his government would take 'an even-handed approach and let the law take its course' (Kumar 2008; Ramesh 1997) . The SAD gradually distanced itself from Sikh ethnonationalist claims to be the champion of Punjabiyat, an overarching loyalty to Punjab regionalism in the interests of communal harmony, economic development and maintaining law and order (Chima 2015) . Probably because it was in a coalition government at the centre, the leadership of SAD steadfastly refused to raise the religious, political, economic and territorial demands that had led to the autonomy movement in the early 1980s. (Singh 2012) . The second concerned the demand for the release of political prisoners from the insurgency period. When there was significant mobilisation for the release of these prisoners, the SAD undertook covert operations to discredit the campaign that had gathered widespread momentum within Punjab and the Sikh diaspora (Chima 2015) .
The third, and most serious, occurred between September and November 2015 in incidents of desecration of the Guru Granth (the Sikh holy book). Wholesale mobilisation by the Sikh populace led to a virtual standstill in Punjab. While the Sikh religious authorities sought to give vent to the anger and dismay at these incidents felt by the Sikh community, their mobilisation was countered by the SAD through its control of Sikh religious institutions which placed them at odds with popular sentiment, leading to well-publicised splits within the Sikh clergy and the committee which manages Sikh Shrines -the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (Ahmed 2015; Jain 2015) . Not unexpectedly, today the SAD's claim as the premier representative of the Sikh community is severely damaged. In a situation reminiscent of the 1980s and 1990s, when the SAD failed to deliver on the ASR, it stands to be outflanked by more militant organisations that are waiting on the wings. This is the accepted version of an article that will be published by Taylor & Francis in Regional and Federal Studies: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20 Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/25494/
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Finally, the trauma of the events of the 1980s and 1990s persists in the collective consciousness of the Sikh community but the political demands that led to these events remain largely unaddressed. Nor has there been an official process of healing and reconciliation within the state. Under appropriate conditions, therefore, the claims of Sikh nationalism can re-emerge and readily undermine the contingency of the current social and political order and 'how it conceals its own impossibility' (Edkins 2003: 5) . In the rapid changes that are now affecting the Sikhs of Punjab -the collapse of the agrarian economy, the assimilative pressures of the BJP sponsored Hindutva project (Jaffrelot 1996) , the decline in the legitimacy of Sikh political and religious institutions, the rise of new religious movements at the boundaries of Sikhdom among Scheduled Castes and other socioeconomically disadvantaged castes, and rampant corruption -it would be premature to rule out a more strident assertion of Sikh separatism in the future. As the historical experience of the politics of cultural containment in the peripheral regions illustrates, either through coopted indigenous regional elites, or the exercise of force, 'normalcy' is regularly punctuated with periods of high levels of violence.
Conclusion
The 'strange' death of Sikh ethno-nationalism in mid-1990s needs to be understood against Indian state strategy to defeat separatism. It does so through a combination of extreme force and the accommodation of political elites in the peripheral regions where they abjure political demands in return for regional power. The use of force to manage, or eliminate ethnonationalist movements in the periphery, is a highly developed strategy that is brought into play when regional political elites either oppose the centre's rule or regularly exhaust their (Sathyamurthy 1997: 718) Before 1947 Mostly because Nehru and other INC elites were exceptionally successful in using the partition to embed beliefs about the new state's borders, the mere questioning of these beliefs became synonymous with subversion. Indeed, after the Indo-China war (1962) the Sixteenth Constitutional Amendment Act (1963) was passed making the questioning of India's territorial integrity and unity a criminal offence and requiring all state and national legislators to swear an allegiance to India's unity. In sum, the autonomy and self-determination movements in the peripheral regions regularly contest the ambiguous reality of India's ethno-linguistic federation. In so doing, they provide a critical counterpoint to the relative 'success'
of Indian democracy and its federation.
i Arguably the greater social, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity of these regions poses challenges for Indian federalism that are less obvious than in other states (Adeney 2015) . This is certainly the case in the north-east, but not in the north-west. The salient cleavage in both regions, however, is that of religion; namely, most of these states have non-Hindu majorities. Religion, exceptional ethnic diversity, and the legacy of partition/independence (Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Nagaland), has tested the ethno-linguistic principles of Indian federalism so that alternative modes of accommodation e.g. Article 370 of the Indian Constitution which grants special status to Jammu and Kashmir, have been evolved. It also needs to be stressed that the two regions command only 7 per cent of India's 1.2 billion population (2011) (Lustick 1979) . In between these two extremes, an ethnic democracy might attempt to move towards a liberal democracy, or practise brute majoritarianism, thereby circumscribing the rights of marginal groups. In such a context, the main ethnic group 'can effectively dominate another segment (or segments) through its political, economic and ideological resources; and where this superordinate segment (or coalition of segments) can extract what it requires from the subordinated' (O'Leary and Authur 1990). This form of rule has been termed 'hegemonic control' because 'it makes an overtly violent segmental contest for state power either "unthinkable" or "unworkable" on the part of the subordinated segments' (ibid.). Thus, whereas 'violent control' resembles overt domination, suppression and open confrontation, 'hegemonic control' combines elements of coercion with some degree of consent that often underpins administrative structures. v This is clearly the case with SCs, and STs and such accommodation dates from the time of M. K. Gandhi. After 1947, some minorities, for example the Sikhs, had their collective rights revoked and were made subject to Hindu Personal Law. Article 25 of the constitution, moreover, defined the Sikhs (as well as Jains and Buddhists) as sects of Hinduism. Also, the criteria for SCs and OBCs were clearly defined by the overarching emphasis on caste within the Hindu tradition; and when this was challenged, the courts continued to err in favour of the hegemonic understanding of these categories. The Supreme Court held that 'the caste to which a Hindu belongs, is essentially determined by birth and that if a Hindu is converted to Christianity or another religion, which does not recognise caste, the conversion amounts to a loss of the said caste'. x There are, of course, exceptions to this. The peace accord with the Naga rebels in 2011 was followed by a more comprehensive accord in 2015 which has rehabilitated some of the former rebels. However, disagreements remains about the competing narratives of the accord and its ability to deliver .
